The *REAL* resistance heroes of Iraq (that stooges of Zionism and Iran don’t want you to know about)

Hint: they were Ba’athists.

One of the most despicable lying slanders against the last (and monumentally great) Iraqi president Saddam Hussein is the commonly trotted-out binary supposition that “Saddam was a Sunni tyrant who repressed and persecuted the Shi’a majority,” a reductionist narrative promoted by both Zionist-created Salafi-jihadists glorifying a falsely distorted image of Saddam and likewise by Zionist-created Khomeinists who promote that exact same narrative to misleadingly portray all of Iraq’s Shi’a Arab majority as inherently represented by Iran’s Persian-centric Velayet al-Faqeh self-defined ecclesiastical authority.

The notion that “Saddam was anti-Shi’a and hated by all of Iraq’s Shi’a” rivals the absurdity of the inverse case study in Syria, where Bashar al-Assad was long accused (and still is!) of being “anti-Sunni” against the Sunni majority of Syria. Just as Bashar’s government could not last that long without tacit plurality (if not majority) support from Syria’s ~70% Sunni majority, likewise Saddam’s government could not last that long without tacitly significant support from Iraq’s ~60% Shi’a majority. More on the analytical dissection of the Syrian case study another time, perhaps soon.

To cut down on lengthy background explanations: in a nutshell, Saddam Hussein implemented an increasingly schizophrenic umbrella of national policy as the Iran-Iraq War dragged on and harrowing losses were sustained vis-à-vis long-sought efforts to win over the hearts of Iraq’s Shi’a Arab Islamic majority particularly from the south. After the disastrous Gulf War and subsequent sectarian uprisings leading to brutal counterinsurgency reprisals against the southern Shi’a cities harboring insurrection, Saddam’s cross-sect appeal was grievously damaged, and implemented the “Faith Campaign” in an effort to unify both the Sunni and Shi’a around an Iraqi Arab identity of a largely Sufi theological orientation in resolutely firm rejection of both Salafi-jihadism/Wahhabism and Khomeinism.¹ (contrary to the “Iraqi Ba’athists promoted Islamic fundamentalism” canard, Saddam’s regime proscribed the death penalty for Salafi-jihadist/Wahhabi adherents²) Roughly concurrent—or otherwise representing an outgrowth—to that state-sponsored Islamic trajectory was of course the establishment of Fedayeen Saddam, a tyrannically brutal paramilitary of irregulars operating as Ba’ath-loyalist enforcement goons, amongst various late-Ancien Régime shenanigans as the inevitably hardened reactive spirit subsequent to the manifested horrors of foreign-provoked sectarian insurrection.

Now, the standard reductionist mainstream narrative has long insinuated that Fedayeen Saddam’s modus operandi—as that of a late-stage fanatically loyalist band of terror-evoking policing goons—comprised part and parcel of a disproportionately if not entirely “Sunni” organization that alienated the Shi’a majority. However, that is patently incorrect—not only did ranks of the Fedayeen consist of loyal Shi’a Arab members, but they comprised in fact a crucial bulk if not an outright majority, as at least one source from the 2000s notes that the Fedayeen was “a largely Shia paramilitary force”!³ All along, the Iraqi divide permeated within the ethnic and religious “sects” as pro-Ba’athist and anti-Ba’athist sentiments defined both the Sunni and Shi’a bulks of Iraq’s Islamic population majority, and even amongst the Kurds likewise. Although the Republican Guard’s suppression of the 1991 southern insurrection encompassed crudely emblazoned messages of “No Shi’a [will be left] after today” on their tanks when destroying insurrectionists hijacking Shi’a shrines as instrumentalized shields, “other Shia were loyal to this [Ba’athist] institution and even took part in Shia repression against fellow Shia.”⁴ In a nutshell, there was a de facto Shi’a civil war between those nationally loyal to Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party and those in favor of Khomeinist/Sadrist-agitated insurrection against it.

Such internal division within the southern Iraqi Shi’a populace manifested in the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of the country, when anti-Saddam masses of Iraqi Shi’a glowingly cheered on the Zionist occupation as liberators and collaborated with the Crusaders against government loyalists from the Fedayeen who resisted the occupation tooth and nail. While selectively portrayed in some sources through a reductionist “Sunni-Shi’a divide” lens (that hinges and harps over the foreign Sunni jihadist elements, namely those instrumentalized by Assad’s Syria to broadly erode the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq),⁵ the simple reality was that the Fedayeen Saddam rank-and-file members in southern Iraq—who courageously sacrificed their lives sabotaging the Zionist occupiers to the maximum extent possible—were predominantly Shi’a Iraqis:⁶

The first shock to the American and British stereotype of a Shia population eager for the USA to invade came within hours of the commencement of the invasion. US and British forces met resistance on the outskirts of Basra and Nassiriya after entering Iraq from Kuwait. Much of it came from black-uniformed members of the Fedayeen Saddam, his specially organised militia. Although they were part of the Baathist regime, they were local Shias. The lesson the Americans and British should have drawn was that Saddam’s regime was not an entirely Sunni affair. It had many Shia members, including at high levels in the government and the mukhabarat (the intelligence apparatus). The simple view that Saddam’s regime was an instrument for Sunni domination was wrong. Saddam knew he needed control in Shia areas. He became adept at manipulating sectarian and tribal differences and coopting many leading Shias to his side.

Another source confirms this selfsame modern-historical reality:⁷

Saddam co-opted, punished, bribed and tortured Sunni and Shia alike. During the 2003 invasion, as coalition forces approached the southern city of Basra, US and British forces were surprised to meet resistance from black-clad members of the local Saddam Fedayeen, who were local Shias. The Saddam Fedayeen along with the Republican Guard were Saddam’s two personal elite units. The invading forces had assumed all Fedayeen were Sunni. In fact under Saddam there were many Shiite Baath party members. Lost in the narrative of the Sunni-dominant, Shia-subordinate model is the fact that when Saddam consolidated power in 1979, his first victims were Sunni in his drive to favor his own tribe and clan, the Baijat, and the Albu-Nassir.

The irony of course is astoundingly marvelous—the late-stage Iraqi Ba’athist Ancien Régime enforcement goons—those comprising the rank-and-file of Fedayeen Saddam—who were reviled and hated by the Iraqi masses,⁸ ultimately proved to be the last line of self-sacrificing national defense dying to protect the very ungrateful civilians who were palpably duped into believing the occupation would herald a democratically bright future free of tyranny. Even after the “Sunni-dominated” Republican Guard relinquished materialized morale in the face of imminent defeat, the Shi’a rank-and-file of Saddam Hussein’s loyalist Fedayeen mounted an “extremely tough”⁹ resistance to para-suicidal levels of sterling counterinsurgency tactics against the Crusader army of British and American imperial savages.¹⁰ The Fedayeen were organized to:¹¹

…conduct irregular warfare against the technically more advanced coalition. They allowed the armored formations to pass and then attacked logistics convoys. They fought in cities and used the cities as staging grounds for their attacks on the convoys moving through the deserts. They used military supplies stockpiled throughout Iraq in the months leading to the fighting so that they regularly had supplies to continue to fight. They proved to be effective in temporarily disrupting the American invasion plan. Their attacks forced diversions of forces to clearing cities rather than simply bypassing cities.

If ever there existed a modern Iraqi legion of absolutely valiant resistance against Zionism, it was the southern Iraqi Shi’a-majority Fedayeen loyal to the Ancien Régime of Saddam Hussein. Despite all their legitimate personal gripes and qualms against the imperfections of Saddam’s Ba’athist government for its paternalistic treatment of their Shi’a villages and communities, they stood for the dignity and honor of their country, giving their lives as martyrs for the cause of Iraqi sovereignty.

By the time Iraq was lost to the Zionist-Masonic quagmire of manufactured alternating dialectical terrorism between Zionist/Iranian-backed anti-Sunni Badr death squads and Zionist/Iranian-instrumentalized anti-Shi’a AQI death squads, the Fedayeen Saddam as a unified institution of Iraqi national defenders was of course no more—certain Sunni ranks (though not all) by that point were cynically co-opted into Zarqawi’s AQI, while continuously-rooted and nationally loyal Shi’a rank-and-file members were consolidated to a considerable degree into Muqtada al-Sadr’s then-nascent Mahdi Army in a shared sentiment of resistance against the imperial satanic confederation’s three-pronged pitchfork: Anglo-American-Zionist occupiers, Iranian occupiers, and Salafi-jihadist AQI terrorists. Due to the Ba’athist remnants’ status as chief scapegoats, Muqtada’s association with them became an easy lightning rod for rivals to discredit him, and the exact extent of Fedayeen-JAM convergence (widely confirmed generically¹²) is difficult to assess.¹³ Other Fedayeen members, meanwhile, were apparently grafted into Ba’athist Syria as loyalist allies of Bashar al-Assad by the 2010s in the fight to defend Syria against the Zionist/Turkish/Gulf-backed Salafi-jihadist Crusader invasion.¹⁴ Again, the details are murky, and the baseline sourced information I can unearth to publicly share is so far unfortunately limited.

The horrendous tragedy of Iraq is that its true heroes were erased and memory-holed for proving once and for all to have been nationally vindicated towards the face of reality to the eternal chagrin of their unrepentant detractors who thrived off of cynically instrumentalizing not only the Zionist-manufactured jihadist chaos but also the martyred blood of innocents to heinously weaponize to magnify their own phony “resistance” (namely the PMF, KH, and co.) raison d’être charades.

Until the truth is brought to light, there can be no liberation, for how can a person live freely when enslaved by the chains of manufactured dialectically cyclical lies?

1. David Jordan (2021), “State and Sufism in Iraq: Building a ‘Moderate Islam’ Under Saddam Husayn,” ch. viii.

2. Joseph Sassoon (2012), “Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime,” p. 11.

3. Nicolas Pelham (Jul. 15, 2008), “A New Muslim Order: The Shia and the Middle East Sectarian Crisis,” p. 149.

4. Ibrahim al-Marashi (2008), “Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History,” pt. iii, ch. ix.

5. James Hider (2009), “The Spiders of Allah: Travels of an Unbeliever on the Frontline of Holy War,” p. 59.

6. Jonathan Steele (2008), “Defeat: Why America and Britain Lost Iraq,” p. 88.

7. Ralph Lopez (Apr. 26, 2008), “Truth in the Age of Bushism,” ed. II, p. 65.

8. Stephen T. Hosmer (2007), “Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak,” pp. 99-100.

9. Mark Cantrell, Donald Vaughan (2003), “Saddam: The Face of Evil,” p. 171.

10. James Lacey, Williamson Murray (Oct. 21, 2013), “Moment of Battle: The Twenty Clashes That Changed the World,” pp. 411-12.

11. Brian Steed (Feb. 15, 2019), “Iraq War: The Essential Reference Guide,” pp. 106-7.

12. Marianna Charountaki, Daniela Irrera (May 24, 2022), “Mapping Non-State Actors in International Relations,” p. 47.

13. Patrick Cockburn (2008), “Muqtada al-Sadr and the Fall of Iraq,” ch. x, p. 153.

14. Abdulrahman al-Rashed (Apr. 20, 2015), “The Sufist Izzat al-Douri and the extremist ISIS,” Al-Arabiya English.